





In order properly to elucidate the church's doctrine on
indulgences, the theologian must study the practice of granting in*
dulgences in the contexts of the satisfaction of Christ and of peni'
tential works undertaken by Christian believers.1 In his treatment of
indulgences, Thomas Aquinas is concerned to explain how Christ's
redemptive sufferings can spiritually benefit the members of the mysti-
cal body. Aquinas understands that, through indulgences, the church
allots certain spiritual benefits to those who collaborate by one means
or another in building up the mystical body.2 In his view, then, the
theology of indulgences simply develops the general theological axiom
that one person can share according to some determined measure in
1. For the historical development of indulgences, see Bemhard Poschmann, Der
Ablaβ im Licht der Buβgeschichte (Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1948).
2. For example, Nikolaus Paulus, Indulgences as a Social Factor in the Middle Ages,
trans. J. Elliot Ross (New York: Devin-Adair, 1922), illustrates how the church related
indulgences to various aspects of ecclesial communion. See the sections entitled
"Indulgences for Ecclesiastical and Charitable Objects" and "Indulgences for Socially
Useful Temporal Objects."
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the good deeds of another person. To put it differently, as much as
Christians ought to pray for and help one another, indulgences are a
way of giving concrete expression to the communion of saints.
Aquinas undertakes a broad, multifaceted study. Besides analyzing
the nature of indulgences, he also illustrates their connection to the
sacrament of reconciliation, defines the proper authorities for granting
indulgences, and examines the necessary conditions for gaining an
indulgence.3 In the course of these discussions, Aquinas gives clear
evidence that he appreciates how the thirteenth-century church had
made canon law a principal means of establishing the principles of
pastoral care. But since his theological project is not restricted simply
to questions of jurisprudence and pastoral practice, Aquinas normally
discusses such issues, including the canonical aspects of indulgences,
within the broader contexts of soteriology and ecclesiology; as a result,
his conclusions throw more than historical light on the meaning of
an indulgence.
For a complete appreciation of St. Thomas's doctrine, two texts in
his theological corpus merit special attention. The principal places
where Thomas deals with the theology and practice of granting in-
dulgences include his Scήptum super libros Sententiarum 4.20.1.3-5
and Quaestiones de quolibet 2 8.2. To be sure, the editors of the
Supplementum to the Summa theologίae assembled three questions on
indulgences, but Thomas himself set aside work on the Summa before
he was able to confront the questions within its original frame-
work.4 The two ex professo discussions that he did complete belong
to different periods in his career; they also represent different literary
genres. In his "writings" on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which
Aquinas composed at Paris between 1252 and 1256, we recognize a
3. Peter of Bergamo's tabulation, in Opera Sancti Tkomae Aquinaάs Index Seu Tabula
Aurea Eximii Doctoris (Rome: Editiones Paulinae, n.d.), distributes the thirty subjects
related to indulgences under four headings: "In communi," "Ecclesiae," "Agens,"
"Quibus." The Index Thomisticus shows that the vast majority of this material occurs
in Aquinas's Scriptum 4.
4 See Summa theol suppl. 25, "De indulgentia secundum se"; 26, "De his qui
possunt indulgentias facere"; 27, "De his quibus valent indulgentiae." James A.
Weisheipl, Friar Thomas a"Aquino, 2d ed., with corrigenda and addenda (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), p. 362, explains that "the
Supplement, intended to complete the Summa, is 'put together with scissors and paste
from pieces cut out of Aquinas's writings on the Sentences (especially Bk. 4). '"
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systematic treatment from a young theologian. But Quaestio de quolibet
2, recorded at Paris around 1270, gives us an insight into how the
seasoned university professor handled the subject in open debate. In
addition, the De quolibet 2 8.2 gives witness to a certain growth and
change of theological perspective that, according to the opinion of
some scholars, marks Aquinas's thinking during the second half of his
academic career.5
Although I take into account pertinent material from the earlier
treatment in the Scriptum, the text De quolibet 2 8.2 is the principal
focus for this study. I also refer to Aquinas's teaching on merit and
satisfaction, especially his mature treatment of those subjects in the
Summa theologiae^ Still, the brief exposition in De quolibet 2 incorpo-
rates many of the basic theological principles that Aquinas considers
indispensable for a comprehensive understanding of indulgences.? The
crusading indulgences, as we shall see, afford him the occasion for
articulating a theory concerning the place that indulgences occupy in
the church's sacramental economy.
As a principal element of his analysis, Aquinas employs a tradi-
tional metaphor. He speaks about the spiritual treasure chest that
contains the good works of Christ and the saints: the thesaurus ec*
clesiaeβ Even if such language presents an unwieldy metaphor for
5. For example, R.-A. Gauthier, "La date du Commentaire de saint Thomas sur
ΪΈthique a Nicomaque" RTAM 18 (1951): 103, n. 91, argues that during the second
Parisian regency, Aquinas was induced to "mitigate the excessive intellectualism that
he had earlier displayed." See also Santiago Ramirez, De hominis beatitudine 3 (Madrid:
CSIC, 1947), p. 192.
6. See Cessario, The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from
Anselm to Aquinas, Studies in Historical Theology 6 (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's,
1990), for an interpretation of Aquinas's texts on soteriology and Christian satis-
faction.
7. De quolibet 2 8 contains two articles, each of which treats the forgiveness of sins.
The first article asks whether the sin against the Holy Spirit remains unforgiveable.
The second carries the title: "Utrum crucesignatus qui moritur antequam iter arripiat
transmarinum, plenam habeat peccatorum remissionem?" I have consulted Sandra
Edwards's translation, Quodlibetal Questions I and 2, Medieval Sources in Translation
27 (Toronto: PIMS, 1983). Edwards gives a general introduction to this literary genre
and the issues discussed in the two questions.
8. Carl ]. Peter, "The Church's Treasures (Thesauri Ecclesiae) Then and Now,"
Theological Studies 47 (1986): 251-272, examines the history and contemporary
significance of this concept.
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Christ's charity, Thomas nonetheless clearly distances himself from
both mercantile views of redemption and physicalist interpretations of
grace. In brief, he does not consider indulgences as a spiritual deposit-
and-withdrawal system for building up heavenly merits, as if they
were so much interest in a bank account.9 Indeed, we can uncover
no justification in Aquinas's theology for the well-known abuses of
the later Middle Ages, especially the so-called sale of indulgences
by professional "pardoners." One might even argue that if Aquinas's
theological finesse in treating indulgences had shaped the practice of
the church in the sixteenth century, they might not have been one of
the issues that provoked Protestant reform. For Aquinas consistently
demonstrates that indulgences form an integral part of the church's
mission to communicate both the merits of Christ's sacrifice and his
satisfaction to believers in the truth of the gospel.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
PARIS, 1269-1272
The historical circumstance that links the granting of
indulgences to the church's promotion of the crusades serves as back-
ground for De quolibet 2 8.2. Aquinas inquires whether a crusader
who dies before setting forth for the Holy Land and thereby escapes
the hardships and duress of fighting the infidels actually gains a full
remission of his sins.10 The church had formally begun the practice of
9. To be sure, we have examples where Aquinas's language lends itself to such an
interpretation, as when he suggests in the De quolibet 5 7.2 that meritorious deeds can
remain with us "quasi apud Deum deposita," but the context clearly indicates that
the idiom is suggested by the Vulgate, as for example in 2 Timothy 1:12, "Scio enim
cui credidί, et certus sum quia potens est depositum meum servare in ilium diem."
10. The twelfth-century Latin term is crucesignatus. Du Cange renders it as "Qui
sacrae Crucis militiae nomen dabant," Thesaurus 2:1175-1176. Compare J. F. Nier-
meyer, Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), who translates it
as "croise" in French and "crusader" in English. Although it could be argued that,
given the terms of the theological discussion in article 2, a crusader who has taken
the vow remains a crusader-designate until he actually completes the crusade, I have
kept the term "crusader" throughout. For more on the history and significance of
crucesignatus, see Maureen Puree 11, Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of
Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final Loss of Jerusalem to
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granting plenary indulgences as part of its strategy for popularizing the
crusades.11 Admittedly, the exact nature of Pope Urban IPs promise at
the Council of Clermont (1095) remains a matter of dispute among
medieval historians. Nevertheless, the record appears to show that
the pontiff promised remission of all penitential practices incurred
by the crusaders provided they confess their sins.12 In an important
study, Maureen Purcell points to a difference between the language
allegedly used by Urban II at Clermont, "a full remission of enjoined
penance," and the statement by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215,
which promises a "full remission of sin."13 Either way, we can suppose
that a certain confusion between what an indulgence accomplished
and what constituted the actual remission of sins enveloped popular
views on these matters.1"*
the Fall of Acre, 1244-1291, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 10 (Leiden:
E. ]. Brill, 1975), p. 5, n. 4; and Michael Markowskt, "Crucesignatus: Its Origins and
Early Usage," Journal of Medieval History 10 (1984): 157-165.
11. Nikolaus Paulus, Indulgences as a Social Factor, pp. 62ff., includes the crusades
among other worthy enteφrises that the church promoted through the granting
of indulgences. For a comprehensive study of the relationship of indulgences to
crusading, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), especially chapter 1.
12. See Mansi, SCC 20:816. The actual words quoted are "iter pro omni paen-
itentia reputetur." For a detailed analysis of the documentation concerning Pope
Urban's famous speech at Clermont on 27 November 1095, see James A. Brundage,
Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969),
pp. 30ίf.
13. Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, p. 36. For the text of Ad Liberandam Terr am
Sanctam of Lateran IV, see Antonio Garcia y Garcia, Constitutiones Concilii Quarύ
Lateranensis Una cum Commentariis Gbssatσrum, Monumenta Iuris Canonici, series
A: Corpus Glossatorum 2 (Vatican City, 1981), pp. 110-118: "plenam suorum con-
cedimus ueniam peccatorum."
14. Generally speaking, before Albert the Great indulgences were considered
above all a commutation of poena, but afterwards theologians came to define them as
a remission pure and simple. See Albert's Scripta Super Sent. 4.20.E.16: "Dicendum,
quod diffinitiones datae satis possunt sustineri. Si quis tamen hanc dare vellet,
scilicet quod 'indulgentia sive relaxatio est remissio poenae injunctae ex vi clavium,
et thesauro supererogationis perfectorum procedens': puto, quod melius diffiniret."
Albert completed this work before 1249. On the whole question of what indulgences
were commonly understood to mean, see Hans Eberhard Mayer, The Crusades, 2d ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 293-295, n. 15.
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Whatever Pope Urban's true intentions may have been, the fact re-
mains that until the thirteenth century, developments in the doctrine
of indulgences were almost wholly implicit in theological teaching
on the sacrament of penance. By that time, theologians generally
understood indulgences as supplying for the satisfactory works that
ordinarily form part of the sacramental discipline. In the tertia pars of
the Summa theologiae, written shortly after the De quolibet 2, Thomas
explains that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are suitably des-
ignated as the parts of penance.15 Indeed, penitential works such as
prayer, fasting, and almsgiving—all of which can serve as works of
satisfaction—gradually rectify the disorders of soul that result from
a person's sinful actions. Even in his Scriptum on the Sentences,
Aquinas introduces his treatment of indulgences towards the end of
the tract on the sacrament of penance.16 A century earlier, however,
Peter Lombard had not considered the topic of indulgences important
enough to include in the Sentences themselves (1155-1158). Still, the
connection among the sacrament of penance, works of satisfaction,
and indulgences remains important for appraising correctly the prac-
tice of granting indulgences in the thirteenth century.
Since physical participation in a military campaign inevitably in-
volves personal hardships, such an enterprise easily could serve as a
sort of satisfaction for sins. Accordingly, medieval inquiry normally
included as a matter of course such questions as we find posed in
De quolibet 5 7.2 (held in Paris at Christmastime 1271), "Whether
15. Summa theol. 3.90.2: "Sic igitur requiritur ex parte poenitentis, primo quidem
voluntas recompensandi, quod fit per contritionem; secundo quod se subjiciat arbitrio
sacerdotis loco Dei, quod fit in confessione; tertio quod recompenset secundum arbi-
trium ministri Dei, quod fit in satisfactione. Et ideo contritio, confessio et satisfactio
ponuntur partes Poenitentiae." In addition, see Poschmann, Der Ablaβ, especially
pp. 36ff.
16. Scriptum super Sent. 4-20.1 a.3, "Utrum per indulgentiam possit aliquid remitti
de poena satisfactoria"; a.4, "Utrum quilibet sacerdos parochialis possit indulgen-
tiam dare"; a.5, "Utrum indulgentia valeat existentibus in peccato mortali." All in
all, book 4 devotes nine distinctions to the sacrament of penance. The quaestio unica
of the twentieth distinction includes two other articles on the effects of sin in the
life of the believer, namely, a. 1, "Utrum aliquis in extremo vitae suae poenitere
possit"; and a. 2, "Utrum poena temporalis, cujus reatus post poenitentiam manet,
taxetur secundum quantitatem culpae." For a historical study of indulgences during
the early scholastic period, see Nikolaus Paulus, "Die AblaBlehre der Friihscholastίk,"
Zeitschrift fur katholische Theobgie 34 (1910): 433ff.
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a crusader who dies on the way to the Holy Land dies in a better
state than one who dies on the return trip?" or, in De quolibet 2
8.2, "Whether a crusader who dies before he can take the journey
across the sea has full forgiveness of sins?" Although today such
queries may at first seem arcane, they nonetheless facilitate Aquinas's
discussion of a range of issues related to Christian satisfaction. For
example, he turns again and again to the merits of Christ himself, to
the meritorious works of the saints, to the meaning of the thesaurus
ecclesiae, to the purpose of satisfaction in the Christian life, and to
the conditions that permit a person to gain an indulgence.
The quodlibets report public question-and-answer sessions that
took place within medieval universities. At Paris, such quodlibetals
were held only during Advent and Lent. Perhaps the exercise was con-
sidered penitential for the masters. Palemon Glorieux argues that such
unprecedented public discussion first came about at Paris in the men-
dicants' schools, probably during the student strike of 1220-1231. 1 7
Scholars usually date De quolibet 2 from the beginning of Aquinas's
second Parisian regency (1269-1272). 1 8 In the article presently under
consideration, Thomas entertains the question whether a crusader
who dies before undergoing the hardships of fighting the infidels
actually benefits from the crusading indulgence.
Perhaps the question was not purely hypothetical. In fact, the
second article may reflect an earnest concern for the French church
of the mid-thirteenth century. We know that the French king, Louis
IX, came back from his first crusade in 1254. After an unsuccessful
campaign, during which he had been imprisoned for about a month,
he returned disappointed over the results of his labors. The very next
year, Louis had to dispatch a company of royal archers to protect the
17. Palemon Glorieux, La littέrature quodlibέύque de 1260 a 1320 1 (Kain: Revue
des sciences philosophiques, 1925), 2 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935), pp. 9-50. For a fuller
discussion of Aquinas's use of the quodlibetal questions, see Leonard E. Boyle, "The
Quodlibets of St. Thomas and Pastoral Care," Thomist 38 (1974): 232-256, reprinted
in his Pastoral Care, Clerical Education, and Canon Law, 1200-1400 (London: Vari-
orum Reprints, 1981), pp. 232-265.
18. The exact dating of the De quolibet 1-12 remains a matter of dispute among
scholars. See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, pp. 367-368. In "The Quodlibets
of St. Thomas," Boyle also gives a summary of the different opinions concerning the
dating of the quodlibetal questions. Sandra Edwards follows Weisheipl and Boyle in
her Quodlibetal Questions, especially pp. 5-10.
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Dominican convent from the Parisian crowds because they had been
turned against the newly arrived mendicants by partisans of the secular
masters, who strongly opposed sharing university privileges with the
friars. Despite the antagonism generated by established members of the
Parisian intellectual community, Louis remained a strong supporter of
both the Franciscans and the Dominicans. And, according to William
of Tocco, the king especially liked Brother Thomas Aquinas.19
Historical evidence lets us suppose that Thomas had his royal
patron in mind when responding to the question How does an in*
dulgence affect a man who has not had the chance to endure in his
own person the hardship for which the indulgence had been granted.
In 1267, with events in the East growing worse for the Christian
community, Louis IX once more took the cross. But in little more
than a month, after setting sail from Aigues^Mortes in July 1270, the
king died in Tunis. Admittedly, one commonly accepted date for De
quolibet 2 is Christmastime 1269. Still, scholars recognize that the
dating of certain quodlibetal questions remains only probable. For
example, Franz Pelster asserts that De quolibet 2 was actually held
at Christmastime in 1270.20 Accordingly, this suggestion seems quite
reasonable: The fate of the French king had indeed raised interest in
the relationship between the remission of punishment and the actual
endurance of a stipulated penalty for sin, to the extent that at the
very next quodlibetal session, a student might well have posed the
question to Magister Thomas Aquinas.
As I have already noted, the plenary indulgence gained prominence
in the church's practice as a result of the tactical objective of recover-
ing the Holy Land. The crusading decree of Lateran IV, Ad liberandum
(1215), clearly states the cause for receiving the plenary indulgence.
Note, however, the exact terms of the decree: the document promises
19. For example, William of Tocco, Hysteria bead Thomae de Aquino, no. 36,
records that "de illustri rege Franciae S. Ludovico dicitur, quod semper in rebus arduis
dicti Doctoris [scil., Thomae] requirebat consilium, quod frequenter expertus fuerat
esse certum: ut utriusque in hoc perpenderetur sanctitas, et illustris regis in dubiis
Doctorem consulendum requireret et sancti Doctoris, qui divino doctus Spiritu, quod
esset utilius, responderet."
20. Franz Pelster, "Literarische Probleme der Quodlibeta des hi. Thomas von
Aquin," Gregorianum 28 (1947): 78-100; and 29 (1948): 62-87, especially pp. 63-
69.
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full pardon of repented sins properly confessed to "all who in their
own person shall undergo this burden [of the Crusade] at their own
expense" ("omnibus qui laborem istum in propriis personis subierint et
expensis").2 1 This decree, in turn, formed the basis for two subsequent
documents, Afflicti corde (Lyons I, 1245) and Zelus fidei (Lyons II,
1274).2 2 We can assume that Aquinas was aware of the first two
decrees. His quodlibetal text acknowledges that a papal letter exists
that promises full remission of the punishment due to past sins for
those who are willing to undertake the hardships and dangers of a
medieval crusade.
THE THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
But what does it mean to affirm that a member of the
church obtains a remission of the punishment due to sin? How can the
church replace punishment for sin with the hardships of a military
campaign? And what theological grounds exist for making such a
claim within the Christian church? In order to discover Aquinas's
answers to these questions, we must now turn to a close examination
of his text.
ARGUMENTS
Aquinas presents four arguments. Two support the thesis
that a dead crusader receives the promised indulgence even if he never
reached the Holy Land; two others (the so-called sed contra argu-
ments) offer reasons for thinking otherwise. Each of the arguments, of
course, supposes the traditional threefold elements of sacramental rec-
onciliation: contritio cordis> confessio oris, satisfactio opens. Judged from
one point of view, indulgences constitute commutations of satisfactory
works attached to particular deeds, such as prayers, pilgrimages, or
other burdensome actions, including the risky and painful undertaking
21. See Garcia y Garcia, Constitutiones, p. 117.
22. See the text in Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, ed. J. Alberigo et al.
(Freiburg: Herder, 1962), pp. 273-277; 285-290. Purceii, Papal Crusading, pp. 187-
199, also reproduces the decrees of 1245 and 1274. The single extant version of
Zelus fidei was first published by H. Fincke, "Constitutiones pro Zelo Fidei," in
Konzΐlienstudien χur Geschichte des 13. Jahrhunderts (Miinster, 1891).
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of military combat. Accordingly, the indulgenced deed, the necessary
condition of the indulgence, theoretically accomplishes the same good
in the sinner that otherwise would have been brought about by the
sacramental penance or satisfaction.
The first two arguments represent what we might call the juridical
point of view. The first points out that the canonical requirements
for gaining an indulgence have been met once the crusader has
fulfilled the stipulated conditions. What are these requirements? The
text mentions two: first, the crusader must confess his sins with true
contrition; and, second, the indulgence must come from the pope,
who alone has jurisdiction over the punishment involved. If these
conditions are fulfilled, the suddenly deceased crusader should benefit
from the indulgence.
1. For anyone to receive an indulgence, it suffices, as stipulated in the
papal letter, that he be truly repentant and that he confess his sins. But
a crusader who dies before he leaves for the crusade has fulfilled all those
things set forth by the official document in order to receive a plenary
indulgence for sins. Therefore he does receive it fully.
2. Furthermore, only God forgives the offense of sin. When the pope,
therefore, gives a plenary indulgence, this is not to be referred to the
offense but only to the totality of punishments. Now according to the
stipulations of the papal document, the one who accepts the crusader's
cross will not suffer punishment for his sins. Thus, he will escape punish-
ment immediately, having achieved the full remission of sin.23
These arguments appraise the disorder of sin as something marginal to
the psychological capacities of the human person. In order to adjust
the punishment due to sin, the church must supply nothing more
than the proper legal formality. As a purely legal convention, an
indulgence absolves the guilty party from whatever penalty he or she
stands liable to suffer.
In other words, the two affirmative arguments simply propose that
in order to gain the indulgence, it suffices that a person possess true
interior contrition for past sins and have confessed these sins to the
priest. Moreover, in accord with the terms of the papal letter, the
actual indulgence results from accepting the crusader's cross. In other
words, on the assumption that God alone forgives sins (what the
Scholastics referred to as culpa), the pope simply grants remission of
23. De quolίbet 2 8.2 ob.1-2 (ed. R. Spiazzi [Turin: Marietti, 1956], pp. 36-37).
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sin's punishment (what the Scholastics called poena) to those willing
to accept the burdens of a crusade. T h e two arguments clearly consider
the punishment due to sin as a juridical reality over which the pope
holds authority in the same way that an appellate judge can commute
the sentence meted out to a convicted prisoner.
The second set of arguments takes up the question from another
point of view that reflects the Augustinian teaching on sin as a
deformation of the image of God that remains to some extent even in
the baptized. In particular, the second sed contra argument raises the
parallel of forgiveness within the sacrament of reconciliation. In the
sacrament, the person who confesses and displays sorrow for his or her
sins receives absolution from the offense of sin through the ministry
of the priest. Still, the tradition also holds that the penitent remains
bound to satisfactory works that must be accomplished either during
this life or in purgatory. In brief, satisfaction readies one to see God.
1. Augustine says in De Trinitate 15 that to take out the arrow is not the
same as to heal the wound. The arrow of sin is removed by the remission
of sin; the wound, however, is cured by the restoration of the image [of
God], which satisfactory works alone accomplish. But the crusader who
dies before he undertakes the actual crusade has undergone nothing for the
restoration of the image. Therefore, the wound is not yet healed; and thus
he would not enter glory immediately without suffering the punishments
of purgatory.
2. Furthermore, any priest uses these words, "I absolve you from all your
sins." If therefore the dead crusader escapes all punishment for sin, by
the same token anyone who receives absolution from a priest should also.
This, however, would be unsuitable.24
The first of these arguments especially provokes Aquinas to inter-
pret indulgences from what we might nowadays call a personalist
standpoint. Since sinful actions disregard the in-built teleologies of
human nature, sin affects the psychology and character of the whole
person. Only a sort of remedial discipline can redirect human ener-
gies towards virtuous activity, that is, fully heal what are described
metaphorically as sin's "wounds." C a n Aquinas supply a theological
explanation that demonstrates why the practice of granting indul-
gences does not involve an inconsistency with this notion of sin?
How does an indulgence respect that sin represents something more
24. De quolίbet 2 8.2 so 1-2 (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
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than the simple infraction of a divine rule or the breach of moral
conventions?
As I have explained, a particular theology of sin controls Aquinas's
approach to this matter. Sin conforms our psychological powers to
purposes that fall short of incarnating God's goodness in the world.
Since this sinful deformity implies disordered attachments to created
goods, conversion entails satisfactory works. In fact, satisfaction finds
its explanation in the human need for reordering our appetites towards
morally good objectives instead of bad ones. This alone accomplishes
the restoration of the original godly and godward image in the human
creature.
The contrary arguments do not suppose that God assigns punish-
ment for sin after the manner of a courtroom proceeding. Rather,
the punishment due to sin arises from the very nature of sin itself. As
Augustine reminds us, the effect of every disordered action remains its
own punishment. Appropriately, Thomas cites Augustine's text from
De Trinitate 15, "non est idem abstrahere telum, et sanare vulnus."
Aquinas interprets this saying to mean that it is one thing to forgive
sin (according to the metaphor, to remove the arrow) and another
to heal the wounds caused in our human character by sin. This latter
process, the restoration of the image of God in the human being,
can only come about as a result of spiritual discipline. And Aquinas
ascribes this task to works of satisfaction. Now the crusader who dies
without performing the equivalent of such satisfaction has not under-
gone the purgation required to be able to behold the face of God.
Furthermore, the deceased crusader, according to the second argu-
ment of this set, does not seem to be in any different position from
the ordinary Christian who receives sacramental forgiveness. And it
would be unfitting to infer from the case of the unfortunate crusader
that satisfaction held no place in the scheme of Christian conversion
and renewal. However, if the forgiven sinner or the indulgenced
crusader were excused from all of sin's poena, this would imply that
the restoration of the image of God occurs without human effort or
personal commitment.
THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
In the body of the text, Aquinas begins to establish the
theological basis for granting a commutation of the rectification that
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works of satisfaction ordinarily accomplish in the repentant believer.
First Thomas enunciates a basic principle of Christian soteriology,
namely, that one person can satisfy for another. Christ accomplished
precisely such a work. So Aquinas begins:
For the resolution of this question, it should be noted, as was said above,
that the work of one person can be satisfactory for another, whom the
doer's intention designates.
But Christ shed his blood for the church, and did and underwent many
other things which are to be judged of infinite value by reason of the
dignity of [his] person. Thus it is said in Wisdom 7:14 that in it "there is
infinite treasure for human beings." Likewise all the other saints had the
intention in those things which they suffered and did for God that such
would be for the well-being not only of themselves, but for the whole
church.25
The notion that the quality of the person directly affects the value
of whatever sufferings he or she undergoes finds its antecedent in
certain provisions of Roman law. Because of the sovereign dignity of
Christ's personhood, Christ's work, one can argue, possesses a kind
of infinite value. In a way similar to Anselm's argument in Cur Deus
homo? Aquinas applies the principle here to account for the universal
efficacy of Christ's passion. Or, as the canonical scriptures express it,
Christ died "once for all" (Hebrews 7:27).
Aquinas argues next that all Christians can participate in this
spiritual good insofar as they form one body in the church. Although
the good deeds of the saints possess such a value only insofar as they
themselves remain united with Christ, the personal actions of Christ
and the saints are said to constitute the thesaurus ecclesiae, the treasury
of the church. In order to concretize this notion, however, Aquinas
recalls the canon that the one who presides over the universal church
on earth possesses authority to dispense this treasury to everyone
who remains united in the same bond of charity. In accord with
the traditional terminology, Aquinas refers to the authority of the
Petrine office as the "power of the keys."
Therefore, dispensation of this treasure belongs to the one who is in
charge of the whole church; hence the Lord gave to Peter the keys of
the kingdom of heaven [Matthew 16:19]. Accordingly, when either the
well-being or absolute necessity of the church requires it, the one who
25. De quolibet 2 8.2 corp. (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
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is in charge of the church can distribute from this unlimited treasure to
anyone who through charity belongs to the church as much of the said
treasure as shall seem to him opportune, either up to a total remission
of punishment or to some certain amount. In this case, the passion of
Christ and of the other saints would be imputed to the member as if he
himself would have suffered whatever was required for the remission of
his sins, as happens when one person satisfies for another, as has already
been explained.26
The union in charity forms the ultimate ground for the possibility of
sharing in the good works associated with Christ and the saints. When
Aquinas speaks about imputation, he rather intends the sort of loving
communication among the members of the church that forms them
as if into one person.27 In a certain manner of speaking, indulgences
help formalize the participation by one member of the church in the
good works of another member.
Accordingly, whether by a total remission, or by only a partial
remission, of the punishment due to sin, the beneficiary of an in^
dulgence relies on the sufferings of Christ and of the saints as if
having undergone personally the same suffering for sin. As Aquinas
puts it in De quolibet 2 7.2, "All who are in charity are like one
body, and just as the hand is devoted to the whole body and likewise
to any member of the body, so the good of one redounds to all."28
Aquinas argues that charity, which represents the highest perfection
that a human person can achieve, and the ecclesial bond that charity
generates are to be considered of greater significance in establishing
the grounds for indulgences than the requirements that strict justice
would impose.
Now Aquinas can resolve the question of the crusader who dies
before he reaches the Holy Land. First, Thomas summarizes the three
canonical conditions for receiving an indulgence: (1) the work must
involve a cause pertaining to the honor of God or the needs of the
26. De quolibet 2 8.2 corp. (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
27. For instance, see Aquinas's discussion of this point in Summa theol. 3.49.1.
Compare Cessario, Godly Image, pp. 159ff.
28. In De quolibet 2 7.2, Aquinas is explaining why the prayer of one can benefit
another. He affirms that "omnes qui sunt in caritate, sunt quasi unum corpus; et
ίta bonum unius redundat in omnes, sicut manus deservit toti corpori, et similiter
quodlibet corporis membrum." Aquinas refers back to this explanation in the text
of 8.2.
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church; (2) the indulgence must be established by a duly constituted
authority; (3) the one who receives the indulgence must already enjoy
that union of charity in which the whole reality of the church consists.
For an indulgence to benefit anyone, however, three things are required.
First, a cause that appertains to the honor of God, or for the necessity or
utility of the church. Secondly, authority in him who grants it: the pope
principally, others insofar as they receive either ordinary or commissioned,
that is, delegated, power from him. Thirdly, it is required that the one
who wishes to receive the indulgence should be in the state of charity.
And these three things are designated in the papal letter. For the appro-
priate cause is designated in that one is sent forth to help the Holy Land;
the authority, in that mention is made of the authority of the apostles
Peter and Paul, and of the pope himself; charity, in the recipient, in
that it is said: "to all truly sorry and confessed." It does not say, "and to
those who have satisfied," because the indulgence does not excuse from
contrition and confession, but does take the place of satisfaction.29
The medieval canonists freely incorporated elements of moral and
dogmatic theology into their various efforts to organize the adminis-
tration of the church. 3 0 As the text above makes clear, the canonical
outlook governed even such strictly theological topics as divine char-
ity, Christian satisfaction, and the Petrine office.
Second, Aquinas replies to the actual case by insisting on a close
reading of the terms given in the papal letter. On the one hand, if the
text mentions the actual undertaking of the crusade, as is so in the
decrees of 1215 and 1245, then the dead crusader does not gain the
indulgence. On the other hand, if the mere intention to go on crusade
{votum ίtineris) constitutes the condition, then the dead crusader has
fulfilled what is required.
So, for the question proposed: if according to the provisions of the
papal document the indulgence is granted to those taking the cross for a
military expedition to the Holy Land, the crusader immediately gains the
indulgence, even if he should die before he actually leaves for the crusade.
In this case, of course, the condition for the indulgence remains a vow
to go and not the actual undertaking itself. If, on the other hand, in the
29. De quolibet 2 8.2 corp. (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
30. For a discussion of poena and culpa in the work of the canonists, see Stephan
Kuttner, Kanonistische Schuldkhre, Studi e testi 64 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apos-
tolica, 1935).
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phrasing of the document it is stipulated that the indulgence should be
given to those who actually cross the sea, then the one who dies before
he makes the crossing has not fulfilled the condition for the indulgence.31
At this point in the discussion, Aquinas establishes that he is con*
versant with the pertinent canonical legislation and that these legal
distinctions play a role in his theological judgment about how indul-
gences work.
In considering the live crusader, we can easily understand how
one who actually endures the hardships of the crusades qualifies for
the indulgence. For example, in De quolibet 5 7.2, composed after
the text presently under consideration, Aquinas simply affirms that
the crusader who dies upon returning from the crusade, all other
things being equal, dies with greater merit than he would have done
before experiencing the hardships because such a person has person-
ally endured the difficult undertaking. At the same time, Thomas
acknowledges that from the point of view of the moral nature of the
action, to go on a crusade is more meritorious than merely to return
from one.32
But Aquinas also undertakes the more difficult case of explaining
why the crusader who dies on route to the Holy Land can benefit
from the indulgence. How can a merely juridical act, even one issued
by the competent authority and fulfilled according to stipulations set
down in the papal brief, ready a soul for beatitude? Elsewhere Aquinas
explains that the purification of a soul by the punishment of purgatory
constitutes nothing else than the expiation of the guilt of punishment
required for entering glory.33 Given Augustine's presuppositions, the
person who has not undertaken such a purification cannot see God
because the sinner's personal dispositions remain disproportionate to
divine beatitude. But how can an indulgence change our dispositions?
31. De quoUbet 2 8.2 corp. (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
32. De quolibet 5 7.2: "Manifestum est autem, quod ille qui moritur in redeundo
de ultra mare, ceteris paribus, cum pluribus meritis moritur quam ille qui moritur
in eundo: habet enim meritum ex assumptione itineris, et ulterius ex prosecutione,
in qua forte multa gravia est passus. Et ideo, ceteris paribus, melius moritur ille
qui moritur redeundo; quamvis ire sit magis meritorium quam redire, genus operis
considerando."
33. Scriptum super Sent. 4.45.2.2.2 ad 3: "[P]urgatio animae per poenas purgatorii
non est aliud quam expiatio reatus impedientis a perceptione gloriae."
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In order to follow Aquinas's reasoning, we need to recall that
the general principle for sharing in the spiritual goods of another
person differs depending on whether we are talking of merit or of
satisfaction. Since merit directly entitles a person to a reward, merit
remains incommunicable. On the other hand, the members of the
church can share works of satisfaction; just as a person can pay the
debts of a friend, so a person can consign satisfaction to another
believer. The eminent satisfaction of Christ and the superabundant
satisfaction of Mary and the saints form a treasure that the church
guards and administers through indulgences: "All the other saints
had the intention in those things which they suffered and did for
God that such would be for the well-being not only of themselves,
but for the whole church."34 So if the crusader has endured nothing
difficult or dangerous, the grounds for allowing him pardon for sin's
punishment without his having duly performed penitential activity
find their ultimate explanation in the supreme satisfaction that results
from Christ's charity.
This explanation develops a theme that Aquinas frequently em-
ploys in discussions of Christian redemption. He upholds the principle
that one person can satisfy for another. For example, in the Scriptum
we find the assertion, "unus pro alio satisfacere potest."35 In De quolibet
2 7.2, Aquinas further specifies the basis for this sort of interchange:
"one is able to satisfy for another, if the former intends this."36 We
now recognize that the metaphor of the treasure graphically symbolizes
that the members of the church satisfy for one another. As a result,
the church can oversee and regulate the conditions for this exchange.
The church indulges those persons who, for whatever reason, have
not actually undergone a painful process of spiritual regeneration by
themselves. "The reason," writes Aquinas, "why indulgences work
remains the unity of the mystical body, in which many perform
penitential works beyond the measure of their debts and patiently bear
34. See above, note 25.
35. Scriptum super Sent. 4-20. L2.3. In this instance, however, St. Thomas makes
a distinction between satisfaction and merit. In the latter case, as Summa theol. 1—
2.114.6 clearly teaches, no one can merit grace for someone else in strict equivalence
(ex condigno) except Christ alone.
36. De quolibet 2 7.2: "sed secundo modo opus unius valet alteri per modum
satisfactionis, prout unus pro altero satisfacere potest, si hoc intendat."
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many unjust treatments, through which a multitude of punishments
are able to be expiated."37 Although the reason remains implicit in the
quodlibetal text, Aquinas holds that Christ's love remains powerful
enough to alter what the sinner himself did not have the occasion
(or perhaps the will) to do for himself.
Accordingly, the satisfaction of Christ remains the principal source
of this thesaurus. In the De quolibet 2, Aquinas makes the point that
the dignity of Christ's personhood accounts for the exceeding value
that his sufferings produced in the church. Of course, this leads us to
consider the supreme charity and obedience with which Christ lived
his life. In the Summa contra gentiles, for example, we find a complete
discussion of these dispositions in Christ. There Thomas explains the
universal benefits of Christ's passion by citing the dignity of the person
who suffers, *'ex dignitate personae patientis," and also by appealing to
the charity with which Christ embraced his salvific mission, "ex maiori
caritate procedens."38 Obviously, these affirmations remain crucial for
the present discussion.
Aquinas reasons that Christ's heroic love can overcome even the
habitual sinner's resistance to godly living. So, the duly indulgenced
sinner who dies without undergoing the actual restoration of the
divine image is ready for the beatific vision. In another theological
opusculum, the Collationes super Pater Noster, Aquinas insinuates a
reason to explain why this can happen within the mystical body.
He affirms "that the Lord strengthens us against temptation by the
fervor of charity, because any charity no matter how small can resist
sin."39 All in all, the incarnation remains the underlying reason
37. Scriptum super Sent. 4.20.1.3: "Ratio autem quare valere possunt, est unitas
corporis mystici, in qua multi operibus poenitentiae supererogaverunt ad mensuram
debitorum suorum et multas etiam tribulationes injuste sustinuerunt, per quas multi-
tudo poenarum poterat expiari."
38. See Summa contra gentiles 4.55.
39. Collationes super Pater Noster, Petitio 6: "Regit autem hominem ne inducatur
in tentationem per fervorem caritatis: quia quaelibet caritas quantumcumque parva,
potest resistere cuilibet peccato." Aquinas gave these Lenten sermons in Naples in
1273. Earlier (c. 1270) in the Summa theol. 1-2.114.6, he had made a similar point:
"Sed anima Christi mota est a Deo per gratiam, non solum ut ipse perveniret ad
gloriam vitae aeternae, sed etiam ut alios in earn adduceret, inquantum est caput
Ecclesiae et auctor salutis humanae, secundum illud ad Heb., 'Qui multos ίilios in
gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis' etc."
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for our spiritual progress and well-being; and this communication
of divine goodness can overcome whatsoever indisposition sin may
generate in us.
REPLIES
According to scholastic practice, the replies to the open^
ing arguments provide Aquinas with an opportunity to supply further
clarifications on the topic under discussion. Aquinas addresses each
of the four original arguments in turn. The first reply simply asserts
the obvious conclusion that a close reading of the stipulations in
the papal letter implies. If the condition of the indulgence requires
that one actually journey to the Holy land, then, Aquinas rejoins, "it
should be pointed out that in this last case, the crusader who dies
lacks what is most important for an indulgence, namely, its necessary
condition."40
On the other hand, the reply to the second argument clarifies
two distinctions that have emerged in the course of the argument.
The first distinction concerns the offense (culpa) of sin and the
punishment (poena) that results from sin. The second distinction
points out the difference between mediated divine authority, associ'
ated with the sacrament of holy orders, and the power of jurisdiction
which, according to the customs of the time, even a noncleric may
exercise. First of all, Aquinas recalls a basic premise of all sacramental
theology: Only God exercises the principal agent's causality in a
sacramental action.
To the second: It should be noted that only God possesses the authority to
forgive sin's guilt. But mediately it also belongs to the priest, insofar as he
offers the sacrament of the forgiveness of sins, for example in baptism or
penance. Nevertheless an indulgence does not embrace the forgiveness of
sin's guilt, since it is not a sacramental reality; thus it belongs not to order
but to jurisdiction. For even a nonpriest can grant an indulgence if he be
commissioned to do so. Therefore, the punishment is totally remitted if
the condition is fulfilled, not, however, if it is wanting.41
Even though other mediators participate in the divine authority,
only God can forgive the actual offense of sin; indulgences only
40. De quolibet 2 8.2 ad 1 (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
41. De quolibet 2 8.2 ad 2 (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
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concern sin's punishment. While from a theological point of view sin's
punishment directly affects the character of the believer, a juridical
aspect to these punishments still remains. As a theological metaphor,
the thesaurus ecclesiae combines this juridical aspect of indulgences
with the theological reality of participation in the satisfaction of
Christ. Since the church can regulate the juridical punishments—
for example, in prescribing certain works of satisfaction for particular
transgressions—the appropriate persons can establish the conditions
for allowing a sinner to benefit from the thesaurus ecclesiae. As we have
seen, Aquinas considers it especially fitting that, since the Roman
pontiff presides over the universal church, he alone can establish
these conditions.
In the reply to the third argument, Aquinas throws still further light
on the important distinction between satisfaction as a juridical act and
as a theological reality. In this text, we find the clearest expression
of the reason why an indulgence can supply for the actual restoration
of one whose life has not been reformed by penitential activity.
Aquinas's resolution does not depend here simply on technicalities
of language in a papal decree. Again, satisfaction can be considered
in two ways: as punitive inasmuch as it belongs to retributive justice;
and as remedial or healing insofar as it forms part of the sacramental
system. Strictly speaking, then, indulgences supply for satisfaction only
in its punitive aspect.
To the third: Satisfaction is both punitive, inasmuch as it remains an
act of vindicative justice, and restorative, inasmuch as it is in a certain
sense sacramental. An indulgence therefore takes the place of satisfaction
insofar as it is punitive: because the punishment that another undergoes
is imputed to this one as if this one had undergone it, therefore the guilt
of punishment is removed. An indulgence does not, however, take the
place of satisfaction insofar as it is medicinal, since there still remains the
proneness to sinning left from prior sins, the cure of which necessarily
entails the work of satisfaction. Accordingly, the crusader, while he lives,
should be counseled not to omit satisfactory works, insofar as they serve
to guard against repeated sin, even though the guilt of punishment stands
totally removed, nor does this require any labor; for the labor of Christ's
passion suffices. For one dying, of course, such prevention is not required,
only liberation from the guilt of punishment.42
42. De quolίbet 2 8.2 ad 3 (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37).
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Clearly, the power of Christ's love works differently in one who is still
a member of the church on earth than it does in one who has died.
The need for spiritual discipline and reformation of life implies that
the first one must continue on as part of the church on earth, for death
marks the end of a person's deliberate involvement in the process
of salvation. And since the good works of one individual do not
appreciate another's spiritual discipline, Aquinas counsels penance
even for the individual who does survive the crusade. Even though the
successful completion of the indulgenced work replaces the punitive
satisfaction, the crusader still needs to do penance for spiritual growth
and maturity.
Satisfactory works in the church serve a dual purpose. First of all,
since sin results in a state of alienation from God that requires redress
on the part of the sinner, satisfaction—which Aquinas construes
formally as love and obedience, and materially as bodily suffering—
can restore the relationship. Of course, Aquinas clearly recognizes
that the alienation lies in the sinner and not in an injured God.
Because the sinner needs to redress the imbalance caused by sinful
disorder, theology can still speak about vindicative satisfaction. O n
the other hand, satisfaction also possesses a therapeutic function. For
the sinner willingly undergoes certain exacting exercises that reorder
his or her psychological powers towards godly living. Undoubtedly,
an indulgence can only satisfy the vindicative aspect of satisfaction.
A n indulgence cannot assure that the beneficiary receives the ben-
efits of spiritual training in virtuous living. But if someone dies, the
spiritual communion of the church insures that the indulgenced soul
enjoys passage to the beatific vision without undergoing the ordinary
purifications.
The final reply again treats the relationship of an indulgence to
the sacramental system. Aquinas has already indicated that satis-
faction possesses a certain (quoddam) sacramental power. Thus, he
recognizes that theology can only apply in an analogical way the
concept of sacrament to satisfaction, and the indulgence that sup-
plies for it. Aquinas restates the principle that the priest mediates
God's forgiveness for the offense of sin. While a partial forgiveness
for only some sins would impugn the totality of loving communion
required by divine charity, sacramental absolution nonetheless leaves
some of the punishment due for sin intact. On the other hand, an
indulgence can remove all of the punishment for sin, as happens in
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the crusader's indulgence, because of the spiritual authority exercised
by the pope.
To the fourth: The words of the priest saying, "I absolve you from all your
sins," do not refer to punishment, but to the offense of sin, for which the
priestly office authorizes absolution. Now no one can be absolved from
one offense without being absolved from all of them. But punishment
can be dismissed either totally or partially. For punishment is dismissed
partially by sacramental absolution; totally, however, by the spiritual grace
of an indulgence: as the Lord himself says [John 8: 11] to the adulterous
woman, "I do not condemn you; go, and sin no more."43
Significantly, in his De regimine principum, Aquinas even identifies
this ecclesial authority with the very primacy of Christ's headship
over the church.^ In this text, Thomas's "personalist" orientation
embraces the New Testament teaching on the divine authority which
Christ communicates to Peter and his successors.
The citation from John, which brings the article to a conclusion,
both intimates Aquinas's evangelical outlook and inspires his proce-
dure in the whole discussion. According to the Gospel account, Jesus
speaks to the adulterous woman the words that form the basis for the
ministry of reconciliation in the church: "Neither do I condemn you;
go, and do not sin again." In Thomas's commentary on this passage
of the Gospel, he points out that Christ shows himself to be both a
lover of justice and a dispenser of mercy: to be sure, he forgives the
woman her sin; however, he also instructs her to use this experience
as an opportunity to grow in virtue.45 In effect, this reflects Aquinas's
principal concern in developing a theology of indulgences. We find
a remarkable phrase in the third reply that seems to suggest that
indulgenced pardon for sin is not burdensome because "the labor of
Christ's sufferings suffices." In this way, Aquinas brings the discussion
43. De quolίbet 2 8.2 ad 4 (ed. Spiazzi, p. 37-38).
44- De regimine pήncipum 3.10: "Cum enim summus Pontifex sit caput in cor-
pore mystico omnium fidelium Christi, et a capite sit omnis motus et sensus in
corpore vero; sic erit in proposito. Propter quod oportet dicere in summo Pontifice
esse plenitudinem omnium gratiarum, quia ipse solus confert plenam indulgentiam
omnium peccatorum, ut compleat sibi quod de primo principe Domino dicamus, quia
de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus."
45. See in Joan. 8.1.6: "Sed Dominus culpam non amans, peccatis non favens,
ipsam damnavit culpam, non naturam, dicens, Άmplius noli peccare': ut sic appareat
quam dulcis est Dominus per mansuetudinem, et rectus per veritatem."
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back to its proper christological center, which he fully recognizes must
ground any theology of indulgences.
This quodlibetal question is a good example of the distinguished
theological craftsmanship that Aquinas had achieved by the time
he began his second teaching assignment at Paris. The question of
penitential satisfaction had occupied theological investigation since
the end of the eleventh century, when Anselm finished his celebrated
Cur Deus homo? Although some authors slight Thomas's singular
achievement in this area, he makes a significant contribution to
the transformation and revitalization of the concept of Christian
satisfaction.
Aquinas's theology of indulgences clearly represents his seasoned
theological insight. In his mature years, he recasts the institution
known as indulgences by emphasizing how they form part of the G o d -
man relationship. A t the same time, Thomas illustrates the central
role that Christ and his intention plays in the actual life of the be^
liever. Aquinas explains all human effort within the church as a result
of Christ's capacity to communicate the effects of his own sufferings
to his members, "quia sufficit labor passionis Christi." In Aquinas's
"personalist" theological perspective, the mystery of God's love draws
all men and women to God. Because the church is a communion of
charity and belief, indulgences validly express the unity and grace that
mark the visible reality of Christ's body. As a matter of fact, Aquinas's
teaching on indulgences continues a primitive intuition expressed far
earlier by St. Cyprian in his Treatise on the Lord's Prayer:
We do not say "My Father, who art in heaven," nor "Give me this day
my daily bread." It is not for oneself alone that each person asks to be
forgiven, not to be led into temptation or to be delivered from evil.
Rather, we pray in public as a community, and not for one individual but
for all. For the people of God are all one.46
A similar ecclesiological vision undergirds Aquinas's views on indul-
gences.
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